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THE THREE QUEENSLANDS — SIR SAMUEL 






From 1890 to 1892, Sir Samuel Griffith, as Premier of Queensland, promoted a scheme under 
which Queensland would itself have been divided into a federation of initially three provinces — 
North, Central and South Queensland — and then two provinces, North and South Queensland. 
This startling idea would certainly have changed the map of Australia, probably permanently. At 
least at some points, the idea was expressed that each province would enter the Australian 
federation as a separate State and the Queensland federal government would simply be dissolved 
upon federation. The Bill to divide Queensland into a federation of two provinces passed the lower 
House of State Parliament but was defeated in the nominee Legislative Council. It then fell victim 
to the change of government consequent upon Griffith’s appointment as Chief Justice of 
Queensland, to the urgent problems presented by the economic depression, and even, from the 
conservative point of view, to the rise of labour in politics. Little has been known about this nearly 
successful plan until now. This article attempts to close that gap. 
 
 
I   BACKGROUND 
 
In his monumental history of the drafting and passage of the Australian federal Constitution, 
Professor John Williams draws attention to what he calls, following Professor John La Nauze,1 Sir 
 
                                                                         
* Fellow of the Royal Historical Society; Professor of Law, University of Adelaide; Honorary Professor of Law, Marburg 
University, Germany; Honorary Associate Professor, RMIT University, Melbourne. 
For various forms of assistance in completing the research for this article, the author wishes to thank: John 
McLaughlin AM; Professor Horst Lücke AO; Peter Sheppard; Tania Shipp of the Queensland Department of Natural 
Resources, Mines and Energy; Professor John Williams; and the Queensland Parliamentary Library and Research 
Service. The usual caveat applies. 
Throughout the events recounted here — from 12 August 1890 to 13 March 1893, to be precise — Sir Samuel 
Griffith QC was Attorney-General for Queensland, as well as its Premier and Chief Secretary. However, it would be 
tedious to refer to him by the style of ‘Griffith A-G QC’ throughout this article; the post-nominals should be taken as 
read. 
In this article ‘cl’ designates clause numbers of the Bills; ‘cll x/y’ refers to cl x in the first Bill for three provinces, 
and cl y in the second Bill for two provinces. If only one clause number is given, the clause number was the same in 
both Bills, or the surrounding text shows clearly which of the two Bills is being referred to. If a section number follows 
after a semi-colon, it refers to the comparable provision in the Australian Constitution. 
1  John La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972) 49 n *. 
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Samuel Griffith’s ‘ghost’ draft of a federal Constitution for Queensland, and reproduces, from 
Hansard, the outline of an early version of the scheme.2 If either scholar possessed a copy of the 
full Bill, there is no sign of it. The present author has, however, discovered both original Bills in 
several places,3 and this article will be devoted to analysing the details of the scheme, public and 
official reaction to it, the reasons for its near success and eventual failure, and what it can tell us 
about Griffith — the centenary of whose death we mark this year — and the eventually successful 
plan for Australian federation. 
Separatism in Queensland has, of course, a long history. Even today separatists are still 
sometimes heard from. Historians who have noticed Griffith’s scheme for a federal Queensland 
or concerned themselves with the history of early separatism in Queensland have provided a 
number of explanations for its strength in the late 1880s and early 1890s.4 One is the presence of 
strong leaders — above all ‘a small, pale-faced intense Irishman named John Murtagh 
Macrossan’5 (1833–91), Australian federationist, North Queensland separationist and long-
serving MP for Townsville. Another is obvious from the map, namely, the vast size of Queensland 
 
                                                                         
2  John Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 2005) 26–30. See also 
John Williams, ‘Samuel Griffith and the Australian Constitution: Shaking Hands with the New Chief Justice’ (1999) 4 
New Federalist 37, 38–9 (with tables of proposed federal and provincial powers based on the 1891 parliamentary 
resolutions rather than the full Bills, which appeared only in 1892). 
3  Evidently, however, Griffith’s biographer discovered a copy; no claim is made here to first discovery: Roger Joyce, 
Samuel Walker Griffith (University of Queensland Press, 1984) 174 n 65. Although a historian of renown, he was, 
however, not a lawyer, and gives only an outline of the scheme. 
Both Bills, that for three and that for two provinces, are in the records of Parliament House, Brisbane, and were 
supplied to the author by the Parliamentary Library. The first, three-provinces Bill was also published unofficially but 
in full by The Rockhampton Herald (28 June 1892) 6; (29 June 1892) 3; (30 June 1892) 6, and as a two-page, foldout 
supplement (not available on the Trove database at the time of writing) to The Capricornian (Rockhampton, 2 July 
1892). Copies may also be found in the records of the Colonial Office: CO 234/53/257ff (AJCP 1945) (three provinces); 
CO 234/53/448ff (AJCP 1945) (two provinces); CO 234/54/159ff (AJCP 1946) (two-provinces Bill after Committee stage 
in Assembly). Finally, the Mitchell Library of the State Library of New South Wales holds, as Q342.94/Q, ‘Collection of 
draft to final versions of the Bill to provide for the division of the Colony of Queensland into provinces and for the 
better government of the colony as so divided, with relevant associated returns to Parliament’. I am  grateful to my 
friend Peter Sheppard, who looked at this collection in Sydney for me. 
The United Kingdom National Archives also holds, according to its catalogue, two further items of relevance: 
CO 881/9/17, 19 (a memorandum and further correspondence between the Governor and the Colonial Office on the 
division of Queensland), but as these are not available in Australia, as far as I know, I could not consult them. 
4  See, eg, Geoffrey Blainey, A Land Half Won (Macmillan, 1980) 198–203 (‘A Land Half Won’); Geoffrey Blainey, A Shorter 
History of Australia (Random House, 2014) 100; Geoffrey Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North 
Queensland to 1920 (ANU Press, 1972) ch 9; Christine Doran, Separatism in Townsville, 1884 to 1894: ‘We Should 
Govern Ourselves’ (History Department, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981) (‘Separatism in 
Townsville’); Christine Doran, ‘Separation Movements in North Queensland in the Nineteenth Century’, in Brian Dalton 
(ed), Lectures on North Queensland History — Third Series (History Department, James Cook University of North 
Queensland, 1978) (‘Separation Movements in North Queensland’); Ross Fitzgerald, From the Dreaming to 1915: A 
History of Queensland (University of Queensland Press, 1982) 289–95; Katherine McConnel, ‘“Separation is from the 
Devil while Federation is from Heaven”: The Separation Question and Federation in Queensland’ (1999) 4 (December) 
New Federalist 14; Robert Neale, ‘The New State Movement in Queensland: An Interpretation’ (1950) 4(15) Historical 
Studies Australia and New Zealand 198. What follows is taken largely from the above and additional footnotes refer 
only to specific points, quotations or especially relevant primary sources (eg, n 27). 
5  Blainey, A Land Half Won (n 4) 199. 





and the unfortunate location of its capital in one corner. There were all the usual complaints about 
neglect of the north by the south, insufficient or wasteful expenditure, general disregard of 
interests outside Brisbane, and the minority status of northern representatives in Parliament:6 
‘Brisbane always gets the lion’s share of whatever is going’,7 as one contemporary pamphlet 
opposing Griffith’s federalism-for-Queensland plan and favouring a completely separate northern 
colony complained. Climatic differences between south and north produced differences in 
economic structures, which in turn fuelled demands for political measures; north Queenslanders 
paid tariffs designed to protect industries present only in south Queensland while their own were 
unprotected, and north Queensland sugar growers led the charge for imported Pacific Island 
labourers, which was resisted in the south both on moral grounds as an incipient form of slavery 
and to preserve the racial purity of Australia. (On the other hand, the labour movement in the 
north tended to be decidedly unenthusiastic about competition for jobs from Pacific Islanders, 
although it could be mobilised for separation on other grounds.8) Griffith’s government was 
especially vulnerable to northern resentment on the labour question given that it was he, in his 
first period as Premier (1883–88), who had secured a complete ban on Pacific Island labour, 
although he reversed it temporarily in the face of economic difficulties in February 1892, during 
his second term (1890–93).9 
In the eyes of some, climatic differences even made a difference to society as a whole, with 
some people questioning whether Europeans could thrive in the tropics as well as they could in 
more temperate climates. Northerners continued to see themselves as frontiersmen long after 
Brisbanites had become urban sophisticates. 
Some of these points applied also to central Queensland. However, it had no complications 
arising from the import of Pacific Island labourers, the desire for which fed both separatism and 
resistance to it;10 yet, despite its also being quite distant from Brisbane, its claim to separate 
existence was always weaker. The separate province of Central Queensland — ‘a fad of some old 
women and lunatics’,11 as Griffith’s predecessor as Premier insultingly called it in Parliament — 
was in the initial scheme but was dropped from the plan for the federation of Queensland which 
passed the lower House of Parliament in 1892. One factor applied in central Queensland, however, 
just as much as in northern Queensland: residents of the two likely new capitals, Townsville and 
Rockhampton, were markedly more enthusiastic about the idea of separation than those 
elsewhere — the adult men of Charters Towers, for example, voted in a locally organised 
 
                                                                         
6  There were 45 southerners, 16 northerners and 11 from the central district. 
7  Alfred Stephens, Why North Queensland wants Separation (North Queensland Separation League, 1893) 11. 
Significantly, this pamphlet was roundly attacked in a leader in The Cairns Post (15 March 1893) 2. 
8  Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) ch 5 contains an analysis of the workers’ attitude to separation of north 
Queensland; see also below n 12. 
9  Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1880 Amendment Act 1885 (Qld) s 11; Pacific Island Labourers (Extension) Act 1892 
(Qld). 
10  See, eg, Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 November 1890, 1417. 
11  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 September 1892, 1228. 
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referendum in 1890 against separation by 1220 votes to 894,12 and on a visit to Herberton in May 
1892, accompanied by a separationist MP, the Governor found that many residents were at least 
indifferent about whether they were ruled from Brisbane or Townsville; some preferred Brisbane, 
and there was no enthusiasm for separation.13 A reporter visiting from Sydney found similar 
sentiments prevailing in Cooktown.14 There was suspicion that Townsvilleans and 
Rockhamptonites were interested mostly in the increase in prestige that would result from the 
elevation of their cities to the status of capitals, and even simply in the rise of property values that 
they expected.15 There was a distinct drop-off in enthusiasm for separation as one left Townsville 
and environs — in Cairns, for example.16 In the elections of 1888 (for the Parliament that sat until 
the end of 1892 and thus was in session throughout the period during which the three-
Queenslands scheme was live),17 five anti-separationists were elected to Parliament from the 
north: two for Charters Towers, two for Burke, and one for Cairns.18 
There were numerous possible responses to the real or imagined grievances behind 
separatism. The most thorough-going was the creation of a completely new colony or colonies — 
‘territorial separation’ was the term used in the 1890s — and throughout the early 1890s this 
hard-line view was doggedly pursued in opposition to Griffith’s plans, which, if realised, might well 
have resulted in a State of Northern Queensland joining federation in 1901. Another option was 
to do nothing; a further was decentralisation. This could be either of an administrative nature — 
as was provided for in one field of law by the Real Property (Local Registries) Act 1887 (Qld), which 
divided Queensland for the purposes of the Torrens system into the three districts that would 
 
                                                                         
12  ‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland’, Queensland Parliamentry Papers (1891) I 1157, 1166–6 
(where we also read that the few Chinese men qualified to vote for Parliament were excluded from voting in this poll); 
but see the Governor’s comments at 1174; Doran, Separation Movements in North Queensland (n 4) 93. However, 
according to one of the MPs for the district (in Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 
September 1891, 1078), this was because of hostility to black labour, and, if reassured on that point, the electors might 
have made a different decision. 
13  CO 234/53/211f (AJCP 1945) — this was a secret despatch, and thus quite frank. 
14  Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton, 8 November 1892) 3. 
15  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 October 1890, 1060; 17 September 1891, 1114; 2 August 
1892, 859. 
16  Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 30–1. Striking examples are referred to above n 7, and below n 180. The view of 
the Governor also was that the question of the location of the capital was a major obstacle to consensus on separation 
in northern Queensland: CO 234/51/112 (AJCP 1943). 
17  It was only the following Parliament — that elected at the general elections of April and May 1893 — whose duration 
was limited to three years by the Constitution Act Amendment Act 1890 (Qld) s 2; previously, five-year Parliaments 
were provided for. 
18  Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 58 n 37. Multi-member electorates existed at this time; there were 60 
constituencies and 72 members of the lower House. In CO 234/51/2722 (AJCP 1943), the Governor considers a report 
in The Brisbane Courier (6 July 1890) 6 accurate, according to which 23 of 31 newspapers published in northern 
Queensland are for separation and eight opposed — a clear majority, but also a substantial minority. 





later be adopted for Griffith’s first, three-provinces scheme19 — or even financial, with separate 
accounts and appropriations for each part of Queensland.20 
On top of all this was the possibility of action by the deus ex machina in London. After all, 
Queensland had itself been separated from New South Wales in 1859, and Victoria from New 
South Wales in 1851, by Imperial fiat. These separations had both taken place without the consent 
of the parent colony. On the other hand, by the 1890s the Colonial Office was reluctant in the 
extreme to take such drastic measures as overriding the Parliament of a self-governing colony and 
imposing separation on it.21 Queensland, the last of the Australian colonies in time, had been 
established under the New South Wales Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) ss 6 and 7 — the same statute 
that granted responsible government to New South Wales and thus necessarily passed before the 
inauguration of responsible government there. But given that northern and central members were 
both minorities in the Parliament of Queensland,22 they naturally faced an uphill battle to 
persuade Parliament to consent to separation. Accordingly, the all-or-nothing (‘territorial’) 
separationists hoped that, if sufficient clamour were made and they could show that they would 
never receive a fair hearing in Brisbane, the Colonial Office might be convinced that they were a 
hopelessly oppressed minority and fly to their aid over the heads of Queensland’s government 
and Parliament.23 
They were encouraged in this delusion, probably unintentionally, by temporising statements 
from the Secretary of the State for the Colonies, Lord Knutsford, to the effect that their cause was 
to be dealt with by the Parliament of Queensland in the first instance and would not be taken up 
officially in London unless it had been shown convincingly that that body was indeed bent on 
oppressing a united pro-separation north and centre and could not be moved even by the 
strongest of cases. In the early part of the period under discussion the wonderfully Applebyean 
phrase was heard that ‘the matter is not yet ripe for decision’,24 which meant that the Parliament 
 
                                                                         
19  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 October 1892, 1508. The boundaries were soon 
amended by the Central and Northern Districts Boundaries Act 1900 (Qld). 
20  Such a Bill was introduced by Griffith’s predecessor as Premier shortly before he lost office: Queensland, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 June 1890, 27. 
21  As Lord Knutsford, then styled Sir Henry Holland, himself points out in ‘Separation of the Northern Portion of 
Queensland (Further Correspondence Respecting the Proposal)’, Queensland Parliamentary Papers (1887) I 417, 455–
6. 
22  See above n 6. 
23  Indeed, although it is not germane to the present topic — given that I am not writing a general history of separatism 
in north Queensland — the view of Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 40, 50–1, is that a major strategic error of 
the separationists was an excessive concentration on the Colonial Office as a deus ex machina at the expense of 
building up support in north Queensland itself — a particularly grievous error given the Colonial Office’s well-known 
policy of deferring to local opinion on virtually everything, which was in turn a lesson learnt from the revolt of the 
American colonies. By appealing direct to the nominal decision-making centre in London, the separationists 
undermined their cause both with it and in their own backyard; paradoxically, they underestimated their own power 
in the counsels of the Colonial Office. 
24  United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 8 August 1890, 259 (Baron H de Worms, the junior 
Colonial Office minister — whose barony was Austrian); Lord Knutsford himself used the phrase ‘not yet ripe for final 
consideration and decision’: Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1891, I 1157, 1189. The archives show that, 
unsurprisingly, the same line was taken behind closed doors in the minutes of the Colonial Office as in public; the 
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of Queensland had not yet had sufficient opportunity to take a stand on the question; in the 
absence of its stance, the Colonial Office would simply await developments. Later, as the 
denouement approached, Lord Knutsford made his own personal views quite clear and public in 
early May 1892: 
I should prefer to see Queensland in the same position as the Dominion of Canada. I should prefer to 
see three Parliaments, north and central and south, and one central Parliament — that is to say, I should 
prefer to see Queensland, as I said before, in the position of the Dominion of Canada. My personal 
opinion is that in that way the great colony would stand in a stronger position than if it had only the 
three separate Parliaments.25 
Privately, his Lordship wrote to Griffith with essentially the same message: ‘you know how heartily 
I uphold your view of provincial legislatures, but a united Queensland, against territorial 
separation’.26 
But his Lordship added in the public forum that, if Griffith’s Bill were rejected on the votes 
of southern members, things would appear in a different light and Imperial action would need to 
be considered — although he stressed that he was not making a promise on behalf of the Imperial 
government but only expressing his own personal ruminations.27 These qualifications rather got 
lost in some press reports in Queensland, which made it sound as though there were only two 
options: the Griffith proposals or an outright division; if one failed, the other would follow.28 This 
view encouraged the territorial separationists in their all-or-nothing mission. 
A further element of uncertainty was that changes of government and/or colonial secretary 
in London might alter the Imperial government’s view of the matter in any direction; however, 
when the Salisbury Conservative government fell in August 1892 and Lord Knutsford ceased to be 
Colonial Secretary, and the fourth Gladstone ministry — in favour of home rule for Ireland and 
thus conceivably more sympathetic to home rule for Townsville also29 — took office, Griffith’s 
scheme also was about to be extinguished, and the agitation for separation largely ceased for 
some years thereafter in view of the depression and financial crisis of the 1890s. There was also a 
 
                                                                         
question was one for Queensland itself initially and London would interfere only if there were an overwhelming case 
for doing so: CO 234/51/449f (AJCP 1943); CO 234/51/706f (AJCP 1944). 
25  ‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland (Further Correspondence Respecting)’, Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers (1894) I 501, 505 (‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland’). 
26  Letter from Lord Knutsford to Samuel Griffith, 31 May 1892, Mitchell Library of the State Library of New South Wales, 
MSQ 188, 342 (also in State Library of Queensland, CY 3063). What prompted this statement by Lord Knutsford may 
appear only from Griffith’s letter to him, which may not be extant or, if it is, only in England. Or there may have been 
nothing more in the private correspondence; his Lordship may be basing this statement on what he learnt from the 
official correspondence, to which of course I had access. 
27  ‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland’ (n 25) 501, 505. At 502–3 the Secretary of State is 
reported by the Agent-General for Queensland to have added another condition: even if the Griffith scheme were 
rejected, before considering outright separation the Colonial Office would first be inclined to require the Parliament 
of Queensland to make arrangements regarding the division of and security for the united colony’s debt. 
28  Telegraph (Brisbane, 9 May 1892) 2 has his Lordship saying that if the Griffith scheme were rejected, ‘the Imperial 
government would not delay taking action. He hoped, however, that the southern members would not force the 
Imperial government to take action.’ 
29  Compare Blainey, A Land Half Won (n 4) 196. 





permanent bureaucracy behind Lord Knutsford — the Colonial Office — which was far less easily 
roused to change its view of the world. As well as being naturally reluctant to increase its workload 
by increasing the number of colonies in an already large empire, it was also populated by sticklers 
for constitutional principle and liable to be lobbied by the numerous creditors of Queensland who 
thought that a division of the colony might reduce the security of their debt.30 
One reading of Griffith’s federation-of-Queensland scheme is therefore that it was simply 
stalling until the issue died a natural death, an empty show put on in bad faith, ἵνα καὶ ποιέειν τι 
δοκέωσι ποιεῦντες μηδὲν.31 Griffith was, after all, a long-standing and known opponent of 
territorial separation. As the movement for Australian federation gained strength, he was 
opposed to a complete split for a further reason: an extra stand-alone colony would make the 
hard task of federating even harder.32 However, my reading of the materials is that Griffith was 
sincere in his proposals for a Queensland federation and not putting them forward as mere 
legerdemain. He was convincing in his advocacy33 — even angry and disgusted when accused of 
bad faith34 — and at one stage he hinted strongly at the government’s resignation if the proposals 
were not passed;35 he thought that something needed to be done to combat the evils of remote 
government while believing equally strongly that separation was in no one’s interests. He thought 
of his scheme as a happy compromise that would satisfy all but the extremists and allow the 
benefits of autonomy to be enjoyed without the complications of full separation; leaving aside the 
Federation issue, these included the need to find some way for two colonies to guarantee the 
joint debt and the possibility of mutually hostile tariffs.36 Importantly, Queensland would continue 
to be a single unit for the purposes of negotiating a continent-wide federation, and he 
 
                                                                         
30  See below n 116. 
31  Herodotus, Histories, 4.139.1 — ‘so that they might appear to be doing something while doing nothing’. Griffith, for 
his part, suspected some northern members of insincere support for his scheme, οὐ γὰρ δή, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβούλοντο 
εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι (Herodotus, Histories, 3.143.2) — ‘for they had indeed, it seemed, no desire to be free’ — rather, they 
hoped that they would be able to go to London and obtain complete separation after its defeat, or merely feared that, 
if the demand for a separate province were satisfied, their victim status and platform would be taken from them: 
Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 September 1892, 1242; cf The Brisbane Courier (5 August 
1892) 4; below n 195. Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 62–3, states that Griffith might have been led by nuances 
in Lord Knutsford’s statements hinting at the possibility of action in London into formulating his federal-Queensland 
proposal; this, however, leaves out of account: Griffith’s ability, through the Governor, to communicate officially with 
Lord Knutsford as needed and make objections that were bound to be taken into account; the private correspondence 
between the two men (eg above n 26; below n 198); Griffith’s awareness that too much should not be read into every 
passing Colonial Secretary’s choice of words and that inaction in Brisbane did not necessarily entail action in London; 
and the more obvious inspiration for federalism within Queensland in the concurrent continent-wide proposals. 
32  Joyce (n 3) 173. 
33  See, eg, below n 187. 
34  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 August 1892, 1020. Towards the end of the story, he 
also showed impatience at the interminable discussions: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
29 September 1892, 1403. 
35  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 August 1892, 901; see also 3 October 1892, 1548; The 
Brisbane Courier (11 August 1892) 4; Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton, 11 August 1892) 4; Doran, Separatism in 
Townsville (n 4) 65. 
36  Queensland Parliamentary Papers (1891) I 1157, 1173 [8], 1178 [15]. 
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contemplated the ‘intriguing possibility’37 that the federal Queensland government might be 
dissolved on the attainment of federation and each province become a separate State of the 
Commonwealth. Griffith’s mode of proceedings was also, as we shall see, too cautious and 
considerate of northern interests for the conclusion that it was all but a show; thus, for example, 
his first proposals did indeed provide for separate provincial tariffs, and it was only after securing 
the assent of the northerners to making this power federal that he changed the draft scheme in 
that direction. 
From the point of view of separationists committed to territorial separation, the question 
was whether to accept the halfway house offered by Griffith and possibly remain partially under 
the thumb of Brisbane until such time, if ever, as an Australian federation were constituted, or 
whether to declare his proposals inadequate for their needs and make the best the enemy of the 
good by pursuing complete separation at the risk of getting nothing at all. Opinion even in 
Townsville was divided.38 The North Queensland Separation League, at least, declared total victory 
imminent on the basis that the deus ex machina would shortly descend from London as their 
saviour and therefore rejected Griffith’s proposals as ‘incomplete, unjust, uncertain of duration 
and, whether continuing or ending, … dangerous and hostile to the legislative and representative 
rights and privileges of the north’.39 Anti-separationists were also opposed to Griffith’s 
Queensland federation in the typical alliance of two extremes against a proposed compromise.40 
Although thus foolish and uncompromising — had the separationists compromised and lent 
their enthusiastic aid to Griffith, it is well within the bounds of possibility that there would today 
be a State of North Queensland — it has to be said that, in terms of timing, they had appalling 
luck. One reason for the rejection of the proposals by the Legislative Council in October 1892 was 
that the question should be before the electors in the general elections early in the following year; 
after the elections were held in April and May 1893, Griffith had become Chief Justice of 
Queensland and political attention necessarily switched to other matters such as the depression 
and financial crisis — so Parliament’s rejection of the Bill in October 1892 did not lead the Colonial 
Office to take action after all.41 Nor did the Parliament of Queensland ever take the matter up 
again for reasons that will be explored later. 
II   THE FEDERAL SCHEME 
 
This Part contains an analysis of the chief features of the two Bills for the Queensland 
federation — the first providing for three provinces, introduced to Parliament on 23 June 1892 
 
                                                                         
37  Ross Fitzgerald, Lyndon Megarrity and David Symons, Made in Queensland: A New History (University of Queensland 
Press, 2009) 54. As a result, Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning 
of the Australian Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 157, raises the equally intriguing possibility that the 
three provinces might themselves have negotiated independently at the Federation conventions. I do not t hink that 
was the intention, however; see Byrnes S-G in Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 25 October 
1892, 163. See further below n 151. 
38  Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 62–4. 
39  Queensland Parliamentary Papers (1891) I 1157, 1183; for their hopes of imminent victory, see ibid at 1180. 
40  Thus both of the two sources referred to above n 7 — one an uncompromising separationist from Townsville, the 
other an anti-separationist newspaper — united in their rejection of the scheme. 
41  Doran, ‘Separation Movements in North Queensland’ (n 4) 94–5. 





and denied a second reading on 9 August in favour of a motion supporting a revised two-provinces 
scheme, and the second that provided for only two provinces (North and South Queensland), 
which was introduced on 18 August 1892, passed by the Legislative Assembly on 13 October and 
defeated in the Legislative Council on 27 October. 
A   The Dignified Parts of the Constitution  
 
One thing that certainly stands out in both Bills is the unimaginative names of the provinces: North 
Queensland, Central Queensland (in the first Bill only), and South Queensland. This is not for want 
of alternatives: Albertland and Kingsland, for example, had been suggested as new names for new 
colonies.42 Whether from a dislike of such suggestions or a desire to emphasise an underlying 
unity in the name, Griffith preferred more workaday alternatives. On the other hand, under both 
Bills (cl 3) the three or two provinces taken together would ‘form one Colony or State … under the 
name of ‘The United Provinces of Queensland’ (would the abbreviation ‘UPQ’ have stuck?). 
Griffith declared in Parliament that he had reconciled himself to the word ‘province’ but continued 
to object to the word ‘colony’, which reminded one of a plantation,43 and clearly decided to 
attempt a grander appellation, ‘state’, alongside the usual one. In both Bills the capitals were fixed 
until otherwise provided by law at Brisbane for both the central legislature and the southern 
province44 and at Townsville in the north,45 with Rockhampton being the proposed capital while 
there was a central province (cll 211/195). 
Under the first Bill, as even today in Canada, a federal Governor in the federal capital was to 
appoint a Lieutenant-Governor for each province ‘who shall have and may exercise in the 
Province, during the pleasure of the Governor, and subject to the provisions of this Act, such 
powers and functions as are assigned to him by this Act’ (cl 81; s 2).46 In relation to Royal assent 
to Bills, however, the Canadian model was not followed; provincial Bills were to be sent to London 
if reserved, and if already assented to locally they could not be disallowed by the Governor in 
Brisbane but only in London, although all provincial Bills were to be transmitted to London through 
the federal Governor and news of London’s disallowance of a provincial Bill was to be routed 
through him also (cll 96–8). Leaving the final decision with London was perhaps an attempt to 
mollify the Colonial Office in London, which might have feared, for example, unacceptable 
legislation on Pacific Island labourers. In Canada, disallowance of provincial legislation was a 
federal function performed by the Governor-General, who also appointed the provincial 
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43  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 October 1890, 995; 20 November 1890, 1512. 
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Lieutenant-Governors, and reservation was also to him (s 90 of its Constitution).47 This avoided 
such crossing of wires. In summary, the Canadian provinces’ relationships with the Crown were 
managed entirely from and through Ottawa almost as if they were colonies of an Ottawan empire 
in this respect. 
As with the 1891 all-Australian proposal,48 there was a provision in the first Bill (cl 119) 
requiring the provincial Lieutenant-Governors to communicate with the Queen (in reality the 
Colonial Office) through the Governor of the United Provinces,49 further confusing matters as far 
as the Lieutenant-Governors’ precise status, relationships and functions were concerned. Would 
there have been Royal instructions to the Lieutenant-Governors requiring certain types of Bills to 
be reserved, as existed well into the 20th century for the Australian State governors,50 and, if so, 
who would have issued them — London, which decided on reserved Bills and disallowance, or 
Brisbane, which decided on appointments? If Royal instructions were issued in Brisbane, what 
would they have said about assent to Bills, and what practice would have grown up on that topic? 
Would it have been considered proper for the federal government to advise the Governor to seek 
the disallowance of a provincial Bill in London and for the Governor, if in receipt of such advice, to 
do so? Who was to exercise other Royal powers such as the Royal prerogative of pardon, recently 
the subject of a constitutional battle between Governor and Premier in Queensland in which 
matters had escalated alarmingly quickly,51 and on whose advice? 
In the second Bill with only two provinces, the Lieutenant-Governors disappeared for 
reasons to be mentioned shortly, and there was to be a single Governor only. It was, consequently, 
specifically provided that the Governor might take advice direct from one of the two provincial 
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Executive Councils (cl 105).52 This solution would have complicated matters still further; for 
example, the Governor could be advised by the federal government in Brisbane to withhold assent 
to a provincial Bill or to reserve it for London’s verdict while provincial authorities advised him to 
assent to it personally without reference to London. Federal objection might be taken either to 
the contents of the Bill or to its allegedly exceeding provincial powers. The idea of a Vice-Regal 
office-holder with essentially three masters — the Imperial government with its world-wide 
interests, and two local governments each with a local, democratically legitimated and possibly 
conflicting mandate and world view, possibly on issues as sensitive as Pacific Island labour — 
would certainly have required delicate mutual accommodation at times, which had not been 
much in evidence in the recent dispute over the Royal prerogative of pardon. At no point did 
Griffith go into these problems. 
Analysing the proposal in the first Bill for Lieutenant-Governors appointed locally, the 
Colonial Office was further disturbed by the ‘anomaly’ of a Vice-Regal representative exercising 
Royal powers appointed otherwise than by the Queen (ie through it) — did it consider the 
Canadian provincial Lieutenant-Governors too insignificant to warrant notice? — and minuted: ‘It 
is the first step towards elected governors.’53 Elected governors had indeed been in contemplation 
as the scheme took shape late in 1890, and the superintendents of the former provinces of New 
Zealand provided an Empire precedent of sorts,54 but evidently Griffith shrank from that and 
explained in Parliament that he thought a better class of man would be attracted by appointment 
than by election.55 The separationist leader, JM Macrossan, however, had advocated in 
Parliament American-style active, elected governors.56 How exactly this would have worked is 
anyone’s guess; the elected superintendents alongside the elected provincial councils of New 
Zealand had led to all sorts of weird and wonderful innovations.57 Furthermore, the Colonial Office 
should have realised that it was not any desire for elected governors, but rather its recent stance 
in refusing to provide the name of a proposed Governor to the government of Queensland58 that 
must have made Griffith reluctant to propose vesting the power of appointing Lieutenant-
Governors in it. At this stage of constitutional history, there was a real difference in vesting the 
power of appointment in London or Brisbane; it was not the case that Brisbane would even know 
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in advance whom London proposed to appoint as Governor, let alone have any input into the 
question. 
Griffith’s first scheme, with its four paid Vice-Regal office-holders, two of them to be co-
located in Brisbane, naturally also ran into criticism on the score of cost; his predecessor as 
Premier, BD Morehead, suggested that the scheme, with its multitude of Vice-Regal office-
holders, Houses of Parliament, parliamentary officials and members of Parliament might make a 
good subject for Messrs Gilbert and Sullivan.59 As a result the second Bill, with only two provinces, 
abandoned the idea of provincial Lieutenant-Governors. It was instead envisaged that the 
Governor of Queensland would reside for some portion of the year in the north60 (cl 196 hinted 
at this by providing that he might exercise his powers, either federal or provincial, anywhere in 
Queensland) — a sort of Holyrood Week writ large; when not present in one province he was to 
be represented there simply by a deputy (cl 81) who would probably be an office-holder such as 
the Chief Justice.61 As a sop to central Queensland, the second Bill nevertheless continued to 
provide for the appointment of Lieutenant-Governors if ever there were more than two provinces 
(cl 191); it was not just the cost, but also the greater ease of dividing the Governor’s time when 
there were only two provinces that led to the abandonment of the initial idea of locally appointed 
Lieutenant-Governors.62 
 
B   The Division of Powers  
 
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the three-Queenslands scheme is that Griffith did not adopt 
the American method for dividing powers but a method resembling the Canadian one — except 
that there was no express provision about the residue of unspecified subjects (leading to the 
occasional dispute about which level possessed the residue),63 and the general principle was to 
allocate to each level concurrent rather than exclusive powers as in Canada. 
In both versions of the Griffith scheme there was thus a federal list and a provincial list of 
powers, as there is today in Canada. The federal legislature — called, after the name of New 
Zealand’s legislature from the period when New Zealand was divided into provinces, the General 
Assembly64 — possessed, in both Bills, a long list of 40 powers, while the provincial list extended 
to only 18 items. This prompted complaints that the provinces would have too little power, which 
Griffith answered by reference to item 18 on the provincial list: ‘generally, all matters affecting 
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the internal affairs of the Province which are not assigned to the General Assembly’ (cll 89 (18)/87 
(18)). Not without justice, Griffith identified in those last words, more extensive on their face than 
their obvious model in s 92(16) of the Canadian Constitution,65 the otherwise missing residue that, 
he thought, would lift provincial power to great heights. Several times he referred to the high 
proportion — about three-fourths, he thought — of Queensland legislation that would fall within 
the provinces’ responsibilities and the low proportion of time that was presently taken up in the 
legislature discussing the items on the federal list.66 A comparable federal power — ‘generally, all 
matters affecting the United Provinces collectively’ (cll 62(40)/61(40)) — received much less 
limelight. 
The confidential analysis of the Colonial Office concurred with Griffith; it thought that, under 
his Bill, the central government would ‘be practically wiped out’ and that a larger measure of 
autonomy would accrue to the provinces of Queensland than was enjoyed by the provinces of 
Canada.67 It noted also that there was no mention of New Guinea68 and, in accordance with its 
long-held, if fluctuating, level of concern about settler disregard of Aboriginal rights,69 that it 
would greatly prefer responsibility for Aborigines to be located in Brisbane rather than leaving 
them ‘to the tender mercies of the provincial parliaments’.70 As Aborigines were not mentioned 
on either list — the races power (cll 63(1)/62 (1)), like s 51(xxvi) before the 1967 amendment, 
excluded them specifically — the Colonial Office evidently considered, like Griffith, that the 
residue of unallocated powers lay with the provinces under cll 89(18)/87(18), as indeed it 
specifically stated in its minutes.71 
Griffith’s two lists were not expressed to be either exclusive or concurrent, but the final 
clause of both of his Bills (cll 220/204) made explicit the lack of any provision in the two lists for 
exclusivity; it was the equivalent of s 109 of the Australian Constitution.72 No doubt some difficult 
questions of the scope of the powers and characterisation would have arisen with two presumably 
concurrent lists, but probably they would have been no more difficult than in Canada even though 
their two lists are lists of exclusive powers. Griffith’s scheme did also contain a short list of federal 
exclusive powers (cll 63/62). With the addition of the races power, which I have analysed 
 
                                                                         
65  ‘Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.’ The Canadian provision has been described 
as a rival residue to the federal one, but has in practice proved to be unimportant: Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada (Thomson Reuters Canada, 5th ed, 2007) 504–5. 
66  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 July 1892, 792, 795; 8 September 1892, 1211. See also 
Byrnes S-G in Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 25 October 1892, 164. 
67  CO 234/53/253 (AJCP 1945). 
68  See, however, below n 146. 
69  For an interesting and detailed account and analysis of the Colonial Office’s concerns in an earlier era and how the 
settlers attempted to manage them, see Bain Attwood, ‘Returning to the Past: The South Australian Colonisation 
Commission, the Colonial Office and Aboriginal Title’ (2013) 34(1) Journal of Legal History 50. With regard to 
Queensland, in the 1890s such concerns also extended to the Pacific Island labourers. The generation that had cheered 
on the abolition of slavery in its youth had long since lost its grip upon the levers of power, but their successors 
remained imbued with the unforgettable triumph. 
70  CO 234/53/254 (AJCP 1945). 
71  CO 234/53/253 (AJCP 1945). 
72  There was also an equivalent of covering cl 5 of the Australian Constitution asserting the supremacy of federal law 
over provincial law: see below n 87. 
46   The Three Queenslands   2020  
 
elsewhere in this journal,73 these were essentially the same as in today’s s 52 — including a 
provision for a federal territory for the seat of government (also in cll 208/192; s 122), which can 
have been intended only as a distant possibility, and then only if the coming Australian federation 
did not swallow up the Queensland federal government. 
Looking down the principal, concurrent list of federal powers, one notices many familiar 
items — whether from the Australian or occasionally the Canadian constitutions.74 One of them 
at least raises eyebrows given the last 120 years of constitutional interpretation: the federal 
power over ‘external affairs and the relations of the United Provinces to the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland and to the other Australasian colonies and provinces; but saving always 
the Queen’s Prerogative’ (cll 62(5)/61(5)). Given that there was also a provincial list, it may be 
questioned whether this power would have attained quite the importance it has under our current 
arrangements — but it is curious to see nothing of significance said in this respect in any of the 
debates on the scheme about Queensland’s notorious attempt to annex New Guinea in 1883. In 
Griffith’s scheme there was also noticeably no equivalent of the Canadian federal power (s  132) 
to implement ‘the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, 
towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign 
Countries’, which of course he might well have copied if desired. 
In solving such crucial questions of the scope of the powers granted, the history of the 
Australian federation shows that the interpretative method adopted makes all the difference.  In 
Canada, both central and provincial lists are largely exclusive, and, therefore, to make a long story 
short, most legislation must be characterised so that it fits under one or other list and a balance 
must be found where clashes exist between the two sets of powers. If such an approach had been 
adopted under the Queensland federation, the external affairs power must necessarily have been 
accommodated to the provincial list and (from the present-day perspective) cut back severely if 
the provincial list was not to be robbed of content. On the other hand, if such an approach was 
not taken and the Canadian either-or (‘pith and substance’) approach to characterisation were 
not adopted, perhaps on the basis that the main lists of powers were not exclusive but concurrent, 
things might conceivably have worked out pretty much as now on the external-affairs front — 
remembering, too, that Griffith had an inconsistency section favouring federal supremacy like 
s 109, which does not exist in Canada. 
The only clue about the approach that Griffith himself favoured about such vital questions 
of interpretative method is in the capacity of the General Assembly to refer ‘matters being 
primarily within the jurisdiction of’ itself to the provincial legislatures (cll 89(17)/87(17)).75 This 
word ‘primarily’ is curious. A matter was either among federal powers or not; how could it be 
‘primarily’ so? There was an express incidental power (cll 62(39)/61(39)), but this probably is not 
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the non-‘primary’ power, as it could simply have been referred to directly if it was. The word 
‘primarily’ does, however, suggest that Griffith favoured the ‘pith and substance’ approach under 
which the ‘true’ or primary character not of a power or its scope, but of a law, must be determined, 
as in Canada, so that it falls under only one of the two lists — either, for example, trade and 
commerce (federal) or internal provincial affairs (provincial). That was, of course, also to be his 
approach in the famous early cases such as R v Barger,76 even in the absence of a State list. He 
probably therefore favoured, or perhaps more accurately assumed, a balancing approach on the 
Canadian model to harmonise the two lists of powers. 
In most respects the list of federal powers followed those in our s 51, with some historically 
obvious omissions such as s 51(xxxv) (which was added only after the demise of the Queensland 
scheme), although also with one addition: the substantive criminal law was to be federal 
(cll 62(30)/61(30)), an idea almost certainly taken from the Canadian Constitution (s 91(27)), but 
certainly a poignant one given that Griffith’s next major legislative project — unlike this, a 
successful one — was to be the codification of Queensland’s criminal law. Also probably taken 
from Canada was the idea that, while the criminal law itself was to be federal, the Queensland 
provinces would have responsibility for its administration (cll 89(14)/87(14)); under Canada’s 
ss 91(27) and 9(14) the provinces are responsible for the constitution of the criminal courts. 
A natural federal power is immigration and emigration (cll 62(33)/61(33); s 51(xxvii)). In the 
present context, making this power, along with the races power, federal meant that northern 
Queenslanders would not be able to admit Pacific Island labour off their own bat; it would remain 
a question for all of Queensland. This, alongside their concession on customs to be considered 
shortly, was cited as an important indicator of the willingness of the northerners to compromise.77 
The provincial list was very obviously modelled upon the Canadian list, and indeed two 
proposed provincial powers — ‘the borrowing of money on the sole credit of the Province’ 
(cll 89(3)/87(3); Canada s 92(3)) and ‘the establishment, maintenance and management of public 
and reformatory prisons’ (cll 89(9)/87(9); Canada s 92(6)) were taken word for word from 
Canada’s 1867 provincial list. Missing from the Canadian list in the Queensland version, however, 
are both ‘the Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects’ and ‘the Solemnization of 
Marriage in the Province’ (s 92(11), (12)) — in federal Queensland, marriage and divorce were to 
be wholly central responsibilities (cll 62(29)/61(29)). Queensland’s federal corporations power, on 
the other hand, would have extended, like its early models in the draft all-Australian constitutions, 
only to ‘the Status in the United Provinces of Foreign Corporations, and of Corporations formed 
in any Province or any part of the United Provinces’ (cll 62(28)/61(28)). Presumably, therefore, the 
activities of corporations would have come under the general provincial power; for also on the 
provincial list in both Canada and Queensland may be found — a third and most important 
identical provision — ‘property and civil rights in the province’ (cll 89(5)/87(5); Canada s 92(13)).78 
The Queensland federal legislature’s power over trade and commerce ‘with other Countries  [!], 
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and among the several Provinces’ (cll 62(8)/61(8)) would therefore have been a much more 
important source of federal power to regulate the economy than s 51(i) is today, overshadowed 
as it is by s 51(xx). It is also noticeable that here Griffith did not follow the Canadian approach of 
stating that all trade and commerce was within federal power (s 91(2)); in Canada, it is only by 
judicial interpretation that this apparently extensive power has been cut back and reconciled with 
provincial powers over local affairs;79 such a procedure would have been far less necessary under 
Griffith’s approach, and it has therefore the merit of greater transparency. A notable addition to 
the Canadian provincial list, and a testimony to the great importance of the Torrens system in 
Australian legal culture in general even then, as well as to Queensland’s already decentralised 
lands titles registers,80 is ‘the registration of titles to land’ on Griffith’s provincial list 
(cll 89(7)/87(7)). 
Griffith nowhere explains his decision to opt for the Canadian rather than the American 
system of division of powers in his Queensland scheme. In relation to the all-Australian scheme 
he stated that no list of State powers had been attempted; this ‘would have been to begin with, 
unscientific, and, in the second place, it would have been impossible, because I do not think that 
anybody could attempt to enumerate them all’.81 But he did not say in proposing the Queensland 
scheme in the following year why the ‘unscientific’ and possible had suddenly become ‘scientific’ 82 
and possible. This omission is all the more curious given that Griffith noticeably deviated from the 
Canadian precedent in another important matter shortly to be looked at — and, indeed, declared 
that, had he followed the Canadians in that respect, he would not be proposing a true federation. 
Indeed, at one point Griffith is at pains to say that his three-Queenslands scheme is ‘based quite 
as much upon the United States as upon the Canadian Constitution — rather more’,83 a claim that 
seems hard to justify, but was perhaps a politic one to make. For there is another reason why it is 
a pity that Griffith neither explained his reasons for adopting the Canadian model in the 
Queensland scheme nor proposed the Canadian system for the States of the Australian federation. 
In the 19th century, and indeed even in the early decades of the 20th, the anxiety was expressed 
that any definition of State powers in a Canadian-style list would effect an undue limitation of 
them and was therefore to be avoided in favour of an expansive undefined residue. It was 
sometimes even thought that a system that left only defined powers with the lower level was not 
a true federation; only if the local governments had undefined powers was federalism truly 
present!84 The true potential of the Canadian Constitution for permitting the provinces to exercise 
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real power was at this time only just beginning to be realised.85 We can now see, moreover, that, 
at least as the Australian Constitution is interpreted, it is actually the undefined residue that is 
most vulnerable to being eaten up by expressly granted powers. Our States might conceivably 
have retained more power if there were an actual list of their legislative powers as opposed to 
their receiving just ‘the rest’. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Bill made no mention of judicial review of legislation. Just 
as with the Australian federal Constitution, however, this was ‘axiomatic’,86 and it was 
unnecessary to mention in so many words in the formal constitutional document that, as its 
provisions were law,87 legislation in excess of power would be treated as null and void by the 
courts. Griffith did nevertheless state this in the parliamentary debates.88 He twice rebuffed, 
however, a proposal for advisory opinions on the ground that the meaning of a law could not be 




C   Governmental Machinery  
 
Unlike the Australian federal Constitution (s 106), but somewhat like the Canadian Constitution 
(ss 58–90), Griffith’s Queensland federal constitution set out constitutions for each province, as 
well as for the federal level of government. This was inevitable given that three and then two 
provinces were to be created out of nothing; there were no pre-existing polities that could simply 
be left to operate largely as before. Accordingly, the federal Constitution for Queensland was 
really a new constitutional charter for the whole colony, and indeed both versions of the Bill (s  7 
and Second Schedule) would have repealed all of the basic constitutional statutes in force in 
Queensland at that time, starting with the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld).90 
As already noted, there was to be a federal legislature called the General Assembly, 
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. As with the continent-wide scheme, the 
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former was to contain an equal number of members — eight — for each province and the latter 
to be elected by population. The number of senators was remarkably high given that each 
Australian State received originally only six senators, but probably Griffith thought that the 
Queensland Senate would otherwise be too small. Griffith repeatedly declared, almost mantra-
like, that the principle of equal representation in the Senate was essential to the existence of a 
true federation; the lack of one, he said, meant that Canada ‘is not a federation at all’,91 and it 
followed also that ‘responsible government under a federal constitution was an untried 
experiment’.92 The Senate was to be a permanent indissoluble body whose members would be 
elected not by the people, but by provincial legislatures (as with the contemporary draft of the 
Australian Constitution);93 once every three years each province would elect half its senators.94 As 
the term of the provincial legislatures was also three years, no one legislature could ever elect 
more than half the senators.95 In the later, two-province version of the Bill, there would thus have 
been eight senators representing North Queensland opposite eight representing South 
Queensland. This would have given the northerners a very powerful position, at least if united 
rather than divided along, for example, party lines; they could no longer have been outvoted by 
the north and centre working together. This was further emphasised by cl 66, added to the second 
Bill, under which all laws, except supply for the ordinary annual services, required for their final 
passage an absolute majority in the Senate96 — nothing other than necessary supplies could have 
been passed without at least one northern vote in favour, even if all the southerners combined. 
Under cl 31 of both Bills, the balance of representation was to be maintained, as it is in today’s 
federal Senate (s 23), by allowing the president a deliberative, but no casting, vote; if the votes 
were equal the motion was lost. There were no deadlock provisions comparable to the final 
Australian Constitution’s s 5797 — in other words, no way of overriding the veto of the indirectly 
 
                                                                         
91  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 1892, 1208; see also 29 September 1892, 
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should be directly elected; it was lost nine votes to 23: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 
October 1892, 1433–6. At 1440 we also find Griffith defending the election of the senators by the whole Parliament 
of South Queensland, including the nominee Legislative Council, because, he believes, it will help to reduce 
partisanship. 
94  Clause 20 of both Bills contained a provision comparable to s 13 of the Australian Constitution under which the first 
senators were to be divided into long- and short-term senators to establish the initial rotation. See further below n 
103. 
95  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 October 1892, 1446. Casual vacancies were the only 
possible exception here; cl 21 of both Bills was equivalent to the original s 15 of the Australian Constitution, permitting 
the provincial legislature to choose replacements and interim executive appointments if the legislature was not sitting. 
96  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 August 1892, 1017; 8 September 1892, 1210; Mitchell 
Library of the State Library of New South Wales Q342.94/Q, bundle 4 (copy of this amendment handwritten by 
Griffith). To prevent the abuse of this provision by ‘tacking’, cl 64(4) contained a provision similar to s 54 of the 
Australian Constitution. It is incidentally curious to find Griffith dividing his clause here into sub-sections. This is a 
convenience which was unfortunately not adopted in the Australian Constitution as originally enacted. 
97  Which itself did not appear in the drafts until 1897. 





elected Senate if it refused to pass a Bill sent up from the House of Representatives. At most that 
House could have hoped for change at the triennial Senate elections. Griffith had had his share of 
frustrations at the hands of the existing colonial upper chamber, the Legislative Council, but it was 
not an exact equivalent of his proposed Senate given that the Legislative Council was not even 
indirectly elected and was not a federal body. Unlike the nominated Legislative Council, though, 
the Senate could not even be ‘swamped’, that is, there was no way of adding extra members who 
might be more sympathetic to the government’s views as a crude deadlock-breaking device.98 
Griffith no doubt reasoned that the Senate should have a strong position given its importance to 
his conception of federalism, and in relation to the Australian Constitution he went on the record 
in 1899 to doubt that s 57 would be much needed given that most topics would not cause divisions 
by colony but by party.99 
The House of Representatives’ make-up was modified in the two-province Bill so that a small 
bias was incorporated in favour of North Queensland and it would have one member for each 
8,000 people; South Queensland was to receive one for each 10,000, giving 32 for it and nine for 
the north (cll 32, 35). The final draft of the Australian Constitution in 1891 also provided for 
representation on the same per-person basis, the measure being one per 30,000. In both Bills, 
races disqualified from voting were not to count (cll 34/33; s 25); Aborigines were not to be 
counted at all (cll 213/197; repealed s 127).100 Clause 44 of both Bills preserved the existing 
franchise until it was altered by law, meaning — for now — no votes for women but plural voting, 
a disappointment for radicals who sometimes preferred electoral reform to separation without 
it.101 Griffith saw nothing wrong with membership of both federal and provincial Parliaments, and 
therefore there was no prohibition on dual membership.102 
Clauses 59/58 caused much debate. These clauses were borrowed by Griffith from France,103 
but suggested to his mind also by the precedent of Pring A-G QC,104 and also possibly necessary, 
 
                                                                         
98  See further below n 111. 
99  Griffith (n 91) 115; The Brisbane Courier (27 May 1899) 4. See also below n 184. 
100  On this, see Greg Taylor, ‘History of Section 127 of the Commonwealth Constitution’ (2016) 42(1) Monash University 
Law Review 206. 
101  Worker (Brisbane, 13 August 1892) 3. Both evils were remedied by the Elections Acts Amendment Act 1905 (Qld). One 
of the amendments proposed in 1892 by (Sir) Charles Powers would have prohibited plural voting; his wish list is 
preserved in CO 324/54/61 (AJCP 1946). However, he moved only a fraction of his amendments: Queensland, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1892, 1463. 
102  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 1892, 1211; 13 September 1892, 1234; 29 
September 1892, 1406; 6 October 1892, 1485–6, 1487 (possibly even dual ministerial offices). See also above n 44. 
Even today the prohibition, at federal level, is purely statutory: Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 164. 
103  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 July 1892, 792. It is, of course, the third French republic 
that is in question. Its Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers of 16 July 1875 provided, in art 6 that 
‘the ministers shall have entrance to both chambers, and shall be heard when they request it’: translated in Walter 
Fairleigh Dodd (ed), Modern Constitutions (University of Chicago Press, 1909) 292. It is also interesting to observe that 
art 6 of the French third republic’s Law on the Organisation of the Senate of 24 February 1875 provides, as did cl 20 of 
both Bills, and as does s 13 of the Australian Constitution, for the senators to be divided into classes for allocating the 
longer and shorter terms; in France, however, the division was to be made by lot. 
104  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1892, 1454, 1470. Pring A-G QC had held 
ministerial office although he had not been able to find a seat in Parliament. There was no such constitutional 
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he thought, for the as yet ‘untried experiment’105 of a federal constitution under responsible 
government, which was, he considered, uncertain of success.106 The clauses permitted ministers 
who were not members of a House of Parliament to attend its sittings and take part in debate 
(there was added by amendment: only at the invitation of the House).107 As with the 1891 draft 
of the continent-wide scheme and in accordance with Griffith’s personal views,108 there was no 
equivalent of the third paragraph of s 64 requiring ministers to sit in Parliament; therefore, in the 
United Provinces ministers might have been appointed from outside Parliament and introduced 
into it as, in essence, non-voting members. 
In the provinces, there was to be a body known simply as ‘the Legislature’ (cll 84/82). A small 
blow for autochthony was struck by the alteration of the provision in the first Bill (cl 88) that 
privileges in the provincial legislatures should equal those of the Commons to a conferral upon 
them in the second Bill (cl 86) of the privileges of the Parliament of Queensland.109 
The Legislature of South Queensland was to consist of two Houses, one elected and one 
appointed like Queensland’s existing Legislative Council (cll 120–46/117–44). The Legislative 
Council of South Queensland would consist initially of ‘the Members of the Legislative Council of 
Queensland who at the time of the constitution of the United Provinces are ordinarily resident in 
the Province of South Queensland’ (cll 121/118),110 and all members would hold office for life 
unless they ceased to attend for two sessions or the constitution of the province were altered, 
suggesting an elective House as a possibility for the future (cll 123/120). There was an unlimited 
power of augmenting the numbers vested in the (Lieutenant-)Governor (cll 122/119), meaning 
that the Crown would be faced with the usual dilemma about whether to follow advice if the 
government advised ‘swamping’ an allegedly obstructive majority of nominees.111 The southern 
Legislative Assembly was of course elected, like the single chamber of the other provincial 
legislature(s), again on the same franchise as for Queensland until it was altered by law (cll 134, 
152, 169/132, 151), for a three-year term (cll 132, 150, 167/129, 148).112 That was the same as 
the term of office of senators; how this would have worked out in practice is anyone’s guess, but 
the cycles would inevitably have become disjointed and it may be that this provision would have 
 
                                                                         
requirement under the Officials in Parliament Act 1884 (Qld). An attempt to insert such a requirement into Griffith’s 
second Bill failed: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1892, 1470–2. 
105  See above n 92. 
106  Griffith (n 91) 115; The Brisbane Courier (27 May 1899,) 4; and see Griffith (n 84) 19. 
107  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1892, 1458. 
108  See in particular the interesting exchange between him and Deakin in Debates of the National Australasian Convention, 
5 March 1891, 83. 
109  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 September 1892, 1406. 
110  Three of them would have been put out of work by this provision: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 6 October 1892, 1490. The three members of the Legislative Council from outside South Queensland are 
named by Doran, Separatism in Townsville (n 4) 117 n 89. One was from Rockhampton and would have been saved 
from compulsory redundancy under the two-provinces scheme. 
111  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 October 1892, 1443, 1445. For further details about the 
dilemma, see, eg, Justin Harding, ‘Ideology or Expediency? The Abolition of the Queensland Legislative Council 1915–
22’ (2000) 79 (November) Labour History 162. 
112  See, further, above n 17. 





made for longer Parliaments as governments hung on until an election of senators was possible. 
On the other hand, both other provinces/the other province received single-chamber legislatures 
(cll 147, 164/145), despite Griffith’s stated preference for two Houses. A Canadian precedent for 
this difference between the provinces was close at hand; in this era Ontario had a single-chamber, 
but Quebec a bicameral legislature. Again it was provided only that provincial ministers should be 
‘capable’ of sitting in the provincial legislatures (cll 102/100); there was no requirement upon 
them to do so, and Griffith thought that it would be a good thing at least to have the choice of 
non-parliamentary ministers; the last word, he said, had not been spoken on forms of 
government.113 It was, therefore, not merely the supposedly untried experimental nature of 
federal responsible government that led him to the view that options should be left open in this 
respect, for at provincial level no such complications existed. On another occasion Griffith pointed 
out that the British constitution itself was constantly in flux and there was no reason to think that 
its present state would be frozen in aspic forever.114 There was, finally, no indication, either in the 
Bill or in any parliamentary debate, of the title to be borne by the chief ministers of the provinces 
— not a minor detail given that it was still quite common at this stage to refer to the head of the 
colonial government as the Prime Minister of Queensland.115 
D   Finance, Tariffs and Trade  
 
It was not merely the usual squabbles over money that made these topics particularly difficult for 
the separationists. With Australian federation allegedly approaching, a further set of customs 
barriers was the last thing that anyone needed. But those in favour of separation desperately 
wanted their own tariff, not merely, as we have seen, to counter what they saw as the difficulties 
created for them by a tariff created by southerners to protect southern industries, but also as a 
source of revenue as it was in every other colony — there was no income tax in Queensland at 
this point and it would hardly have built support for separation to promise the introduction of 
one. Yet a further complication was posed by the fact that separation threatened to reduce the 
security of Queensland’s many creditors, who had counted on the backing of the entire financial 
base and taxation potential of the united colony in lending a total of about £28,000,000 to its 
government,116 about eight times its annual revenue. 
Griffith’s initial proposal was for customs duties to be within the sphere of the provinces, 
provided that duties could not 
be imposed upon goods which are the natural products of any province, nor collected upon goods 
passing from one province to another province by land, but the amount payable by one province to 
 
                                                                         
113  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 July 1892, 792. 
114  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1892, 1471. 
115  Denis Murphy, ‘The Premiers of Queensland’ (1978) 10(3) Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 87, 88. 
116  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 November 1890, 1511; Fitzgerald (n 4) 295. 
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another province in respect of such last-mentioned goods shall be from time to time determined by 
commissioners appointed for that purpose.117 
However, the customs revenue raised under provincial legislation was to be received by the 
federal government and used to pay the interest on the national debt, with the surplus — ‘I am 
sure there will be a surplus’,118 said Griffith — to be paid to the provinces according to an agreed 
statutory formula.119 Surely the result of this, which Griffith could hardly have overlooked, would 
have been to encourage the provinces to keep their tariffs as low as possible — Queensland was 
already a high-tariff colony with, perhaps, some room for lowering its tariffs120 — and to look to 
other forms of taxation that they did not have to surrender the fruits of and which they could 
spend on their own account in accordance with the wishes of their voters. This was, after all, the 
period when some colonies were beginning to experiment with income taxes. However, Griffith’s 
plan at this point was certainly a neat and strikingly innovative combination of provincial 
autonomy to tax as required by local needs while also meeting central needs for revenue along 
with the need to convince the Colonial Office that Queensland’s creditors were secure. 
In the final Bills the surplus of federal revenue over expenditure was to be returned to the 
provinces in proportion to the amount of revenue raised in them,121 and it was indeed provided 
that it would be necessary to find out which goods entered Queensland in one province but were 
later exported to another so that the latter province received the credit (cll 202/184; s 93(i)). This 
was perhaps not as difficult as it sounds to us, given that goods on board a ship could simply be 
left on the ship until unloading occurred, and there were few north-south railways then; there 
was no railway between Brisbane and Cairns, for example, for another 30 years.122 As goods could 
be taken by ship between coastal towns, the railway system mostly concentrated on east-west 
lines connecting the inland with a port. On the other hand, monitoring some remote borders and 
tracking goods manufactured with taxable raw materials in one province but then sent to another 
might have been difficult or disproportionately expensive.123 
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Griffith declared himself uncomfortable with the proposal for provincial customs powers, 
and asked the northerners whether they would do without them.124 By the time the Bills were 
drafted,125 the northerners had conceded this power also and the provinces were prohibited from 
levying customs duties (cll 89(2), 199/87(2), 181). The federal government was not to impose 
internal customs duties, for ‘trade and intercourse’ throughout Queensland were to be ‘absolutely 
free’ (cll 201, 62(9)/183, 61(9); s 92). Unfortunately there were no explanations shedding any light 
on what exact meaning this infamous phrase was intended to have; attention concentrated on 
the northerners’ concession of the power to levy tariffs, perhaps in itself a significant clue to what 
this phrase was intended to signify: a lack of internal tariffs and little if anything more.126 
Clause 206 and Fifth Schedule/cl 188 and Fifth Schedule of the two Bills provided for the 
public debt to be apportioned between the federal government and the provinces; essentially, 
the latter took over the debt from local public works while the former received everything else. 
The provinces were to indemnify the central government for their shares of the debt with interest; 
at the last minute a clause (189) was introduced into the second Bill providing for the two 
provinces to pay to the federal government, as assurance for the indemnity, all of their pastoral 
lands revenue, a third of their railways revenue and any other revenue prescribed by federal law. 
This naturally caused bitter, even unparliamentary, protests from the northerners in particular, to 
the effect that the provinces would be starved of funds.127 This clause was most obviously in the 
interests of the British creditors of the colony who could be relied upon to contact the Colonial 
Office in case of the remotest threat to their interests; it is even conceivable that one or other of 
those creditors or bureaucrats was behind the new clause. In its analysis of the Bill the Colonial 
Office had thought the debt provisions ‘ingenious’ but insufficient; it would have preferred the 
whole debt to remain with the federal government and only the charge for it to be apportioned 
to the provinces.128 Just in case the message to creditors was missed, however, there were also 
two express federal powers over Queensland’s contractual obligations and its public debt, to 
which was added in the second Bill, also at the last minute but without opposition,129 ‘the 
adjustment of accounts between the several Provinces, and between the United Provinces and 
the Provinces respectively’ (cll 62(6), (7)/61(6), (7)). 
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E   Judiciary  
 
Griffith’s judicial proposals can be summarised shortly. It is, first of all, of interest that there was 
no formal ‘investment’ of judicial power — no section proclaiming that the judicial power was 
vested in Courts, such as has been productive of so much litigation under the federal Constitution 
over the last 120 years. Rather, in the manner of a State constitution,130 the Queensland federal 
constitution simply declared that the jurisdiction of all Courts continued as before (cll 181, 191, 
192/163, 173, 174). There was no sign of any distinction between federal and provincial 
jurisdiction; it would appear that Griffith considered that the single system of Courts already in 
existence would administer both types of law without difficulty or the need for any special 
provisions. 
While three provinces were proposed, the Bill provided that there should be one Supreme 
Court for both South and Central Queensland until the latter province legislated otherwise; it 
would initially consist of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Queensland resident at Brisbane 
(cl 185) — there were no Judges based at Rockhampton then.131 In both Bills there was to be a 
separate Supreme Court of North Queensland consisting at first of the Judges resident at 
Townsville (cll 186/167).132 The constitutions of the Supreme Courts were to be a provincial 
matter (cll 89(14), 182/87(14), 164); however, the appointment of their Judges was to be a 
provincial matter in the first Bill (cl 184) but a federal one in the second (cl 166). Interest attaches 
to the provisions for an appeals Court given that the want of one, except in distant London, was 
part of the impetus towards Australian federation. However, Griffith’s solution was not 
particularly striking or insightful: there was to be a Supreme Court of the United Provinces of 
Queensland as an appellate Court, although the draft did suggest it might hear second appeals 
from a provincial appeals Court (cll 62(36), 188/61(36), 169). The first Bill had simply left the 
constitution of the all-Queensland appeals Court up to a later statute (cl 189), but the second Bill 
provided specifically that this Court consisted simply of all the Judges of the provincial Supreme 
Courts unless some other provision were made (cl 170); this question, like some others, became 
simpler when there were only two provinces.133 No attempt, of course, was made to limit appeals 
to the Privy Council. 
There were the usual provisions about the removal of Judges, but the second Bill 
supplemented this by a curious provision: with the advice of both the provincial and federal 
executive councils, but without any parliamentary proceedings, the Governor might suspend a 
Judge — for how long is not stated; presumably it could be indefinite — and appoint a 
replacement (cl 166). With surprisingly little debate, this addition was accepted on the assurance 
of Griffith that it ‘was conceivable that a Judge might become insane, and he thought no-one 
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would say that a power of suspension ought not to exist. Of course it would only be exercised in 
cases of great emergency.’134 As there was a general power of removal (also cl 166), which would 
have covered incapacity by reason of insanity, this is very odd and can have been accepted only 
thanks to Griffith’s very great personal authority on such topics. It should also be recalled, though, 
that the Colonial Leave of Absence Act 1782 (Imp) at this time provided a means for the executive 
to remove Judges permanently,135 which was most famously employed to get rid of Boothby J in 
South Australia who did not live to pursue the appeal to the Privy Council that the Act allowed as 
a safeguard.136 I think it unlikely, however, that his case — although it had certainly been famous 
when it occurred a quarter of a century earlier — was present to anyone’s mind at this time and 
place. Was Griffith’s remark rather intended as a side-swipe at the increasingly injudicious and 
radical views emanating from the Chief Justice of Queensland, Sir Charles Lilley?137 
F   Miscellaneous Matters  
 
The Queensland constitution contained a few human rights, as we might now call them, most of 
which were modelled upon those to be found in the 1891 draft of the continent-wide constitution. 
Thus, cll 114/112 denied to the provinces, although (like the contemporaneous draft of what was 
to become s 116) not to the federal legislature, the power to make laws ‘prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion’. Clauses 115/113 (s 117) contained the prohibition on discrimination by 
the provinces against ‘citizens of other provinces’, but continued by saying that a province might 
not ‘deny to any person, within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws’. This 
Americanism, however, was also to be found in the 1891 all-Australian draft. Nevertheless it is 
interesting that this proposal survived, without any comment or objection at all, the parliamentary 
process in Queensland despite its later fate in the continent-wide scheme, especially given that it 
was the hobbyhorse not of Griffith but of Andrew Inglis Clark A-G.138 On the other hand, the right 
to a jury trial on indictment (cll 195/177; s 80) was deleted in Parliament with virtually no debate 
and no objections because Griffith wished the provinces to have a free hand in the matter.139 
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Amendment of the Constitution was to be largely a matter for the ordinary legislatures, as 
was usually the case with State constitutions; there was no attempt at entrenchment of any sort 
or at any level.140 Clauses 62(4)/61(4) were federal powers to adjust the federal-provincial 
distribution of legislative responsibilities, but only with provincial consent (presumably 
unanimous; how this consent would be signified was not specified). The provinces had power to 
amend the constitutions of their legislatures but, unlike the Canadian provinces,141 only within the 
parameters set by the Bills (cll 89(1)/87(1)) — thus, the introduction of a second House, for 
example, or the conversion of the South Queensland upper House to an elective body, would have 
been beyond their local powers. There was also a capacity for the provinces to refer powers to 
the federal legislature and vice versa without a formal constitutional amendment, as already 
noted.142 As we shall also see, Griffith intended that the Bill should be backed by an Imperial 
enactment, which would, presumably, have given very considerable powers of amendment to the 
local (in this case, Queensland’s federal) legislature, as had been done in similar cases in the 
past.143 Some minimal level of entrenchment would surely have been needed, however, for 
otherwise the division of powers itself could simply have been swept away by the General 
Assembly. It does not appear that any thought was given to the exact shape of the provisions 
required to avoid such a possibility while still retaining freedom of amendment. Griffith certainly 
never argued for any degree of entrenchment. 
Federal power also extended to creating new provinces, a matter of particular importance 
after the deletion of Central Queensland in the second Bill; but any alteration of the extent of 
existing provinces required their consent, an obvious obstacle for the central Queensland 
separationists, which Griffith perhaps could have done more to reduce (cll 62(2), (3), 207, 209, 
210/61(2), (3), 190, 193, 194; ss 121, 123, 124). There were also the occasional vague references 
to a fourth province, in the Gulf country, for example.144 Outside the existing limits of Queensland, 
new provinces could have been added without the need for any consent on the part of the other 
provinces, and Griffith occasionally referred to the possibility that his Queensland federation 
might be so attractive to others, ‘by the force of example, if by no other force’,145 that they would 
clamour to join.146 
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In the three-provinces scheme, the coastal boundaries between the north and centre would 
have been at the mouth of the Kolan River, north of Bundaberg, and between centre and north at 
Cape Palmerston, south of Mackay; in the two-province version the boundary between north and 
south would again have been at Cape Palmerston (cl 6 and First Schedule in both Bills).147 In terms 
of population, South Queensland would have started with nearly 300,000 people, the centre 
nearly 50,000, and the north a bit less than 100,000.148 
III   RISE AND FALL OF THE QUEENSLAND FEDERATION 
 
The genesis of the federation-of-Queensland proposal is to be found in an initiative taken by 
Griffith himself only a few weeks after beginning his second term as Premier in August 1890. In a 
major policy speech in Parliament he stated that, just as he lost government two years earlier, he 
was about to propose a division of Queensland into a federation. It ‘is too large for efficient 
administration’ and obstacles to autonomy for the north would be ‘very greatly removed’ if only 
the ‘black labour’ question were settled,149 which it then — apparently — finally was by the 
cessation of recruitment at the end of that same year, 1890, as decreed by Parliament at Griffith’s 
urging in 1885, during his first term as Premier.150 On the achievement of Australian federation 
the federal government in Brisbane would simply be dissolved.151 In his view, the questions of a 
Queensland federation and a continent-wide federation could be considered in tandem.152 
Thereupon, Macrossan, the northern separation leader, took the initiative and moved in the 
Legislative Assembly for complete separation, with the question of a capital for northern 
Queensland resolved with a newly founded city like Washington.  Macrossan argued that this was 
preferable as, in his view, Griffith’s federation-of-Queensland scheme would not provide sufficient 
autonomy for his people. Indeed, if a subordinate province were set up he would advocate for it 
to declare itself unilaterally separate from Queensland. On the other hand, the northern anti-
separationists153 opposed the proposal.154 Macrossan’s motion was lost and an amendment 
proposed by Griffith in favour of his federal scheme passed. Reflecting upon this debate, a leader 
in The Brisbane Courier praised Griffith’s ‘nobility and generosity of sentiment’ to the skies and 
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asked: ‘What more, then, does the most ardent separationist desire?’155 They would receive both 
autonomy and, in time, the larger measure of independence of an Australian State. On the other 
hand, in Rockhampton The Morning Bulletin doubted Griffith’s sincerity, thinking his scheme just 
another attempt to cause delay and avoid separation altogether.156 
At this point the separationists caucused and asked Macrossan, representing the north, and 
Archibald Archer MP, long-serving member for Rockhampton, representing the central 
separationists, to work with Griffith on his proposed federal scheme, partly in good faith — if that 
is not a contradiction in terms! — and partly lest they be accused of rejecting a reasonable offer 
and thereby forfeit their claims to consideration of their cause by the Colonial Office, which was 
all-powerful in theory but reluctant to act in practice. We read in numerous newspaper reports, 
and in Griffith’s own brief account,157 of this meeting on Thursday 30 October 1890 between 
Griffith, Macrossan and Archer, followed by a meeting of the separationists of both hues without 
Griffith. Allegedly, the separationists remained confident that the Colonial Office would take their 
side but thought it politic to show their willingness to compromise and accept Griffith’s scheme, 
which involved customs legislation by the provinces but free trade among them,158 the provinces 
becoming states when Australia federated, and even a suggestion for elected Lieutenant-
Governors with a veto power over Bills like the American President’s. They also agreed not to raise 
any questions of Pacific Island labour.159 Even The Daily Northern Argus in Rockhampton was 
mollified, although it continued to prefer full separation, and, of course, all-or-nothing 
separationists rejected the scheme entirely.160 
Griffith duly introduced an outline of his proposals into the Legislative Assembly with 
commendable speed on 11 November 1890,161 taking care that they were preceded by a rider that 
they were preliminary only and subject to further consideration. Even so, the lists of federal and 
provincial powers that took up the lion’s share of the resolutions he moved — there was no Bill 
yet — were very largely in the shape of the two Bills of 1892, with the exception, already noted,162 
of a provision in these resolutions, as distinct from the Bills, for provincial customs duties. Another 
variation from the final scheme was that the general rule was to be for two Houses in each 
province. The resolutions stated that Vice-Regal representatives, federal and provincial, were to 
be appointed, as was customary. 
A pause for consideration occurred, during which, it would seem, the northern and central 
attitude hardened.163 A fortnight later on 24 October, Griffith made a plea for his proposals to be 
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considered as ‘a friendly act’, not as ‘a fresh act of hostility and animosity’, for otherwise there 
would be ‘no hope’.164 He was to be immediately disappointed; Macrossan, at whose urging the 
scheme had been developed, now thought that it was too late for such half-hearted measures, for 
the people of the north were ‘determined to have separation pure and simple’.165 Newspaper 
reviews were also discouraging.166 Hume Black, MP for Mackay and a strong separationist, gave 
voice to the separationists’ delusions that an appeal to the Imperial government would be enough 
to see them safely separated.167 And a few days later, Archibald Archer, undeterred, brought 
forward a motion in the Legislative Assembly for the complete separation of central 
Queensland — ‘a most unfriendly motion to the government’, said Griffith, ‘as meeting the 
friendly proposals of the government in the most unfriendly spirit, and as meeting the government 
with a direct negative before they can bring their proposals before the House’.168 The motion for 
total divorce was, however, duly lost by 19 votes to 34, with some northerners such as 
Messrs Sayers MP, Rutledge MP (both Charters Towers),169 Hodgkinson MP (Burke), and 
Wimble MP (Cairns) voting against. 
Debate resumed on Griffith’s scheme on 20 November 1890, at around the time that the 
opening of the first Australasian Federal Convention was fixed for March 1891 and after he and 
the separationists had publicly made up after an unusually frank and public spat over the course 
of proceedings in Parliament.170 On behalf of his northern tribe, Macrossan rejected the scheme 
in the debate as offering insufficient legislative and financial autonomy and held out for the deus 
ex machina.171 Both separation leagues, northern and central, continued to advocate for full 
separation, declared their own total victory in London imminent and rejected Griffith’s proposals 
also.172 Wrapping up inconclusive parliamentary debate on the topic for 1890, an annoyed 
Premier said that he would not have brought the proposals forward at all had he known that 
Macrossan & Co would oppose in Parliament what they had urged him outside it to bring forward, 
and that he was ‘quite certain’ that those were the only proposals for autonomy that the 
separatists would see ‘for many, many a long year’.173 Evidently they neither believed him nor 
considered that Griffith might have better sources of knowledge about the attitude of the Colonial 
Office than they did. 
This realisation did, however, finally penetrate many northern skulls towards the end of 
1890 and start of 1891 as the full implications of the phrase uttered in London, ‘not yet ripe for 
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decision’,174 and Griffith’s persuasive powers exercised their influence. In January, The Times 
carried a report to the effect that Griffith’s proposals had been well received on his northern 
tour.175 At the start of June 1891, the final seal was put on the change of attitude when a letter 
from Lord Knutsford (whose officials at least certainly read The Times),176 was published in 
Queensland. In that letter, his Lordship stated that Griffith’s proposals had not been abandoned 
and would offer many of the benefits of complete separation without most of the 
complications.177 All this gave new impetus to the proposals.178 They were announced as part of 
the government programme at the opening of the fourth session of Parliament on 30 June 1891,179 
by which time the 1891 continent-wide convention had also assembled and come up with its own 
draft Constitution — and JM Macrossan had died, depriving the northerners of their outstanding 
leader. The Cairns Post, trying on the mantle of Carlyle, commented:  
Townsville, whom alone the scheme was devised to benefit, turned a shy and cold shoulder to it; and 
the mastermind, who recognised its advantages, and who might have guided the corner-allotment 
patriots [hoping for an increase in land values] to a right way of thinking, is dead.180 
Accordingly, the show was rolled out again, and Griffith introduced his resolutions into the 
Legislative Assembly on 15 September 1891181 — little changed from the previous year even 
though the Australasian Federal Convention had intervened.182 He already had a private written 
pledge from a dozen northern members to support the resolutions in principle.183 Griffith stated 
that he had continued with provincial customs duties only to keep faith with the northerners, 
would prefer a common federal tariff as in the all-Australian proposal, and hoped that agreement 
could be reached on the same rule for the Queensland scheme. In return for an anticipated 
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concession on this point, his resolutions now specifically provided that the federal upper House 
should contain an equal number of representatives from each province184 — perhaps the only 
major change since the previous year and one that was welcomed by the separatists,185 but 
probably, given the importance we have seen him attaching to this point, his intention all along. 
Making a virtue of necessity, Griffith pointed out that the existence of three rather than just two 
provinces would at least prevent the types of stalemates that had paralysed the dual Province of 
Canada (1840–67).186 In response to the various objections urged and queries raised during 
debate, Griffith, whose father lay dying as he spoke, delivered a reply that was praised by several 
observers as one of the best speeches they had ever heard,187 and the House voted on 17 
September 1891 to discuss the proposals in detail in Committee by the fairly narrow margin of 31 
to 23 votes.188 Only one northern member voted against, the radical MP for Burke, John Hoolan — 
who, entirely in character, had delivered a speech in the debate that verged on a rant. The 
remaining 22 votes against, in the House of 75,189 came from southerners.190 
When debate resumed (Sir) Hugh Nelson declared the proposals ‘premature’ and moved to 
close debate down191 — a matter of some future importance given that he was to be Premier from 
October 1893 to April 1898. Yet progress was still made: Griffith declared himself satisfied that 
the northern and central members had agreed to accept an all-Queensland tariff.192 But when it 
came to the crunch on 28 October, the House rejected the resolutions embodying Griffith’s 
scheme by 28 votes to 33 (among whom were only one northern and one central member).193 
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Figure 1 — After Parliament metaphorically poured cold water on Griffith’s 
federation plans at the end of 1891, one cartoonist imagined it being poured literally 
on to him on the floor of the Legislative Assembly194 
Some separationists rejoiced. At last, having made two great concessions on coloured labour and 
the tariff, they would have the evidence they needed to convince Lord Knutsford & Co that the 
south would never give them self-government and the deus would have to fire up its now 
somewhat rusty machina.195 But evidently Griffith had other plans: he asked the MP for Mackay, 
Hume Black — at least, according to that gentleman — to bring in next year a new resolution for 
only two provinces, omitting Central Queensland, and said he was working on a Bill of his own.196 
Griffith himself stated in a report to the Governor at around this time that the deletion of the 
central province would indeed result in success for the scheme,197 and received another personal 
letter from Lord Knutsford stating: 
I much regret that your Bill was not passed, as it appeared to me to be a most fair and reasonable 
solution of the difficulty. It is difficult to form a strong opinion here, but after a very careful perusal of 
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the debates I came to the conclusion that if you had confined the scheme to the North, you might have 
fairly hoped to carry it.198 
Finally, a central delegation to London in May 1892 met with the same cool reception as before. 
It was on this occasion that Lord Knutsford expressed the view that Queensland would be best 
governed with similar institutions to those of Canada, but that if another attempt to pass Griffith’s 
scheme failed, consideration would be given to total separation.199 
In May 1892, as the third and final attempt was about to start, The Brisbane Courier 
commented that separationists’ arguments ‘have been greatly strengthened by the evaporation 
of the Federation spirit that passed over Australia last year, and by the policy of practical repulsion 
which has succeeded the enthusiasm for theoretical union’.200 (The phrase ‘practical repulsion’ 
probably refers to Griffith’s decision, announced in February 1892, to allow Pacific Island labour 
again in Queensland,201 which caused an outcry in the southern colonies. Only a few days after 
those words were written, for example, the Victorian Parliament passed a resolution protesting 
against the decision.202) Many separationists thought their best chance of success might come 
with a federal Parliament for the whole continent, in which the southern Queenslanders would 
be a tiny minority;203 but certainly, if such an arrangement were not imminent, as it did not appear 
to be in May 1892, that was no reason to postpone action. The Brisbane Courier accordingly urged 
all southerners to awake ‘from the torpor that has hitherto characterised our community upon 
this unpopular subject’ — for in five years’ time, it predicted, Queensland would either be divided 
into provinces or utterly dismembered.204 It apparently did not see the status quo as a viable 
option. 
On 26 July 1892, Griffith rolled out what was to be his last attempt with another masterly 
and convincing second-reading speech in which he quoted at length Lord Knutsford’s statements 
promising action if Queensland did not deal with the matter and referred to the fact that almost 
all southern members had voted against the provincial scheme last year, while the vote for it from 
the two new provinces was solid — something that would impress the Colonial Office. Despite all 
the reasons not to proceed with the three-provinces scheme and the moves towards deleting 
central Queensland after the previous year’s defeat, Griffith still came out in this speech in favour 
of three provinces with no obvious sign of the reservations on that point that he must have felt.  
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And this time he had a Bill to offer, not just resolutions; he gave the second-reading speech for 
what I have called the first Bill, that for three provinces.205 (Sir) Hugh Nelson, among others, was 
again opposed and gave the leading speech in reply to the proposals; he objected strongly to the 
threat of intervention from London as a motive for action.206 
Much opposition was in evidence to the claims of central Queensland to provincial status,207 
and one central separationist speculated that the shearers’ strike of 1891 might have caused some 
of his central colleagues to develop cold feet about their own province lest it be dominated by 
socialists.208 Archibald Archer, the leader of the central separationists, was in London lobbying the 
deus ex machina and other assorted deities,209 and Griffith himself scolded the central 
separationists for the weakness of their show.210 On 9 August 1892, by the convincing margin of 
38 votes to 19, the House denied a second reading to the Bill and supported the idea of two 
provinces only.211 Griffith explained to the Governor, and through him to the Colonial Office, that 
the House could hardly have acted otherwise with only one member from the centre speaking in 
favour of such a province and three decidedly opposed to it.212 Needless to say this produced 
unparliamentary fury and wild allegations of betrayal and conspiracies from the disappointed 
advocates of central Queensland.213 In Rockhampton, a monster indignation meeting was held for 
which the whole town closed its doors, ‘down even to the Chinese storekeepers’ as one 
newspaper put it,214 and in the evening one of the three offending parliamentarians, James 
Crombie MP (for Mitchell), was burnt in effigy accompanied by a solemn procession bearing the 
banner ‘Burn the Traitor Crombie’ and the town band playing the ‘Dead March’ from Saul.215 
Promptly at the end of the following week, Griffith introduced the second Bill for two 
provinces only, despite the incongruity and danger of deadlock inherent in a federation of two 
components only.216 He indicated that he had found it possible to dispense with the Lieutenant-
Governors, but further, more radical changes, such as a joint legislature for all Queensland 
consisting simply of the members of the provincial legislatures, now only two in number, had 
proven unworkable. If the government were defeated in the joint body, for example, and elections 
became necessary, which of the two provincial legislatures should be dissolved?217 What we now 
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know as the ‘West Lothian’ problem also made it impossible to have a parliament for North 
Queensland but nothing for the south, for then the northerners would have votes on purely 
southern subjects in the federal legislature although not themselves subject to the laws they 
passed.218 
On 13 September 1892, the Bill convincingly received its second reading.219 It passed 
through committee on 11 October220 and two days later was read a third time, passed the 
Assembly and was sent to the Council.221 Among others, Hume Black MP from Mackay voted 
against it because of his belief that insufficient financial autonomy was offered to the north by 
it.222 But The Brisbane Courier celebrated the Bill’s near-certain passage into law and lavished 
praise upon Griffith.223 
Yet, only a fortnight later, the nominee Legislative Council, after only a few days’ debate, 
rejected the scheme by nine votes to 17.224 Every man voting was a southerner; none of the three 
northern and central members was present.225 The charge against it was led by (Sir) Augustus 
Gregory, ‘the retired explorer and Surveyor-General, … a formidable and wily defender of last 
ditches’,226 who claimed that the Bill infringed s 9 of the existing Constitution,227 given that it 
provided for the alteration of the Legislative Council and had not been passed by two-thirds of all 
the members of the Assembly. This was true, if only because so many members had been absent; 
the votes in favour had been more than double those against, but not two-thirds of the total 
number of members. As a result, members opposing the Bill considered, it was not properly before 
them at all. Byrnes S-G countered in the Council with the argument that s 9 merely prevented the 
Governor from assenting to the Bill without the requisite majority; it did not prevent the Council 
from considering it. 
However, more substantive points were also made. Some of them might legitimately have 
been dealt with in Committee and become the subject of compromises with the people’s 
representatives in the lower House, but fundamental objections were also urged. One point was 
that the Council objected to its own extinction and did not think its proposed provincial substitute 
in South Queensland a worthy successor. On the other hand, a surprising objection came from 
one or two Councillors. These nominees were opposed to the system of nomination to the upper 
House and did not wish to see it further reinforced by the Bill. Some of the proposed federal 
powers, such as to coin money and conduct external affairs, seemed beyond the capacity of a 
colony — very probably there were memories of the attempted annexation of New Guinea in 
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1883. Central Queenslanders’ sympathisers naturally lamented the disappearance of that 
province. Several members declared the system expensive, requiring further taxation, 
cumbersome and complicated; years would be spent untangling the division of powers between 
the federal and provincial levels, and it might even discredit the higher cause of Australian 
federation. The creation of any further territorial subdivisions, in fact, might have the same effect. 
It was pointed out that modern technology such as the telegraph had made it possible to govern 
vast areas much more easily than when Queensland itself had been created. Finally, and perhaps 
decisively, the public should have a chance to make their views known upon the Bill at the 
forthcoming elections; an unelected upper House would be far less likely to stand in the way of 
the popular House with a freshly conferred mandate on the topic, and so the rejection of the Bill 
could be seen as more a question of a postponement until after the elections than an outright 
refusal forever. 
The need for the public to have its say was a curious argument for a nominee chamber to 
adopt; but that need had also been repeatedly raised in its more natural home, the Legislative 
Assembly,228 and it was the line adopted by, for example, The Brisbane Courier,229 ‘an able and 
earnest supporter of the three-provinces scheme’.230 It was a particularly good point not only 
because the Bills involved fundamental constitutional change, but also because the Parliament of 
1888–93 was to be Queensland’s last five-year Parliament; it had itself legislated that future 
Parliaments were to last only three years,231 and thereby in a way confessed its own unsuitability 
to make such changes without reference to the people. Griffith’s answer was to say that the 
electors should have something concrete on which to pass judgement, but also finally to concede 
the point fully and insert provisions postponing the scheme’s operation until after the imminent 
general election with the intention that the scheme could simply be cancelled if rejected by the 
electors.232 The rejection of the Bill by the Council was accordingly anything but final, provided 
that the electors could be persuaded to endorse it at the forthcoming elections; if the will was 
there, a way could then still be found. (In 1893, the second Irish home rule Bill was passed by the 
Commons but defeated in the Lords, but this did not spell the end of the Home Rule movement 
for Ireland either.) 
Accordingly, The Brisbane Courier pleaded for renewed action soon after the general 
elections to forestall Imperial intervention,233 and some separationists still thought Griffith’s 
scheme their best bet as 1892 closed.234 The new Secretary of State for the Colonies in the fourth 
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Gladstone ministry, the Marquis of Ripon, confirmed this realistic view in February 1893 to yet 
another deputation to the deus ex machina; until the elections were held and there was a new 
Parliament in place that took a stand on the matter, the deus would continue to apply only the 
brakes on his machina.235 The officials in the Colonial Office also hoped for a revival of the scheme, 
as it would head off further agitation for separation (and thus pestering of themselves).236 Griffith 
cabled Queensland’s Agent-General in London (for transmission to the deus’s office) to the effect 
that the Bill would be re-introduced after the elections,237 but by this time it was an open secret 
that he would be the next Chief Justice of Queensland and the value of this promise was therefore 
heavily discounted.238 
Griffith also had an answer — indeed, two somewhat inconsistent answers — to the 
contention that his Bill was illegally before the Council. One was that his Bill did not change the 
Legislative Council’s constitution but rather abolished it entirely.239 This was ingenious but 
unconvincing,240 so much so that it seems something of a fault in advocacy even to proffer such 
an argument unless it was meant as a mere face-saver for those who wished to support the Bill 
despite legal quibbles.  His other line was better and incidentally offers an insight into Griffith’s 
plans if Parliament had passed the Bill: he doubted (although on what precise basis he never quite 
said) that any majority of the Queensland Parliament was competent to pass the Bill alone, and, 
thus, as had happened with other Australian colonial constitutions,241 he would advise the 
Governor to reserve it and ask the Imperial Parliament to cure any defects or excess of power by 
the simple expedient of passing a short Act authorising the Queen to assent to it and make it law; 
at the very least, this was the more proper and constitutional course.242 Lord Knutsford and the 
Colonial Office appeared willing to take this course, if the Bill had ever been passed and reserved 
as stated.243 
IV   AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 
 
                                                                         
235  ‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland’ (n 25) I 501, 514. The Governor also agreed with the idea 
of delaying action until after the forthcoming elections: CO 234/54/421f (AJCP 1946). 
236  CO 234/54/83 (AJCP 1946). 
237  See also The Cairns Post (29 December 1892) 2. 
238  The Times (London, 15 November 1892) 5; Daily Northern Argus (Rockhampton, 17 November 1892) 4; see also 
‘Separation of Central and Northern Portions of Queensland’ (n 25) 501, 513. 
239  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 August 1892, 913; 6 October 1892, 1490. 
240  The Colonial Office may have expressed its own disagreement with this idea, had matters ever pushed it to take a 
stand: CO 234/54/114 (AJCP 1946). 
241  Eg, Victoria Constitution Act 1855 (Imp). 
242  Queensland Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 November 1890, 1529; 25 November 1890, 1596; 15 
September 1891, 1052; 26 July 1892, 790; 27 September 1892,. 1371; 6 October 1892, 1488; ‘Separation of Central 
and Northern Portions of Queensland’ (n 25) 501, 513; see also Byrnes S-G in Legislative Council, 27 October 1892, 
186–7. 
243  Lord Knutsford to Samuel Griffith, 31 May 1892, Mitchell Library of the State Library of New South Wales, MSQ 188, 
343 (also in State Library of Queensland, CY 3063); CO 234/53/388 (AJCP 1945). While some doubt about Griffith’s 
argument on the two-third majority point is expressed in the series of minutes at CO 234/54/210ff (AJCP 1946), I do 
not think anyone would have doubted the Imperial Parliament’s capacity to pass the Act suggested.  
70   The Three Queenslands   2020  
 
 
Griffith did indeed become Chief Justice in 1893 and his scheme was never revived. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Obviously, Federation was shortly to engulf the whole continent and 
it meant that, thereafter, agitation would be directed into creating new States of the 
Commonwealth, not making Queensland itself federal. But at the start of 1893 that was still a long 
and very uncertain eight years off,244 and in the meantime the scheme fell flat primarily because 
it had not captured public imagination.245 As Professor Edward Shann put it in his classic Economic 
History of Australia, ‘Griffith’s new plan was dropped because no-one but its author was 
interested enough to comprehend such complexities’.246 An adjective often applied to the scheme 
shortly after its demise was ‘cumbersome’.247 When reading such reactions to the Griffith scheme 
it is important to remember that no one in Australia had any experience of operating the novel 
and complicated system of federalism at this point, and indeed within living memory the most 
conspicuous achievement of the world’s first modern federation had been to collapse into an 
unspeakably bloody civil war. Griffith’s scheme did not possess the boldness and simplicity of full 
separation and also, of course, was not for those who saw no reason for separation in any shape 
or form at all. It acquired a further set of enemies once the central province had been eliminated. 
Indeed, in reading the parliamentary debates and public commentary on the scheme while 
it was still alive, one comes across numerous complaints that there was too little interest in it both 
inside and outside Parliament — no passion and few at the debates, as if no-one ever really 
expected it ever to happen.248 Startling innovations, such as Clark A-G’s American-style due 
process clause, or the provision for the indefinite suspension of judges by the executive, were 
approved with barely a word spoken on them. Nor is this mere hindsight, but the perceptions of 
people at the time. In the general election campaign of 1893, a search of the newspapers also 
reveals Griffith’s scheme to be far less prominent in stump speeches than its importance to the 
regions, the variety of options available and its far-reaching consequences would lead one to 
expect. In Barcaldine, for example — a setting that did admittedly suggest many other possible 
topics of discussion — one candidate, a local lawyer named Fitzgerald who was a few years later 
to receive the honour of being Attorney-General in the world’s first Labour government, 
concluded his hustings speech and was then asked what he thought of separation. Apologetically, 
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he said that he had completely forgotten the topic and his intention to give the audience the 
benefit of his opinions on it, although he then proceeded to do so.249 
After a short interlude of some months under Griffith’s former coalition partner Sir Thomas 
McIlwraith,250 the new Premier was (Sir) Hugh Nelson (October 1893–April 1898), an opponent 
both of continent-wide federation and of any form of separation within Queensland. Clearly no 
assistance could be expected from him. To make matters even worse, a tremendous depression 
and financial crisis then engulfed Queensland (as it did the rest of Australia, to varying degrees), 
and both Lord Ripon and Nelson himself rebuffed all attempts at constitutional change as most 
inopportune given the economic crisis.251 By the time the crisis was over and Nelson had moved 
on, Australian federation was well within sight again and effort was naturally devoted to it instead. 
At almost the last minute, at the ‘secret’ Premiers’ conference of January and February 1899, 
there was added to s 7 of the federal Constitution a provision enabling Queensland to be divided … 
for the purpose of Senate elections only.252 Nothing else specifically for northern Queensland 
separationists appeared, and high hurdles in Chapter VI on ‘New States’ were set up against 
them,253 possibly as the result of still more tactical blunders on their part254 — in this case, 
spending too much time in Brisbane arguing fine points about the make-up of Queensland’s 
delegation to the Federal Convention rather than sending a delegation of some sort from 
Queensland as quickly as possible to take part in, and try to exert some sort of separationist 
influence over, the actual drafting of the federal Constitution under which the fate of their cause 
would soon fall to be decided.255 
A further factor that deterred some separationists from attempting to resurrect the three-
Queenslands scheme is the labour movement’s stunning successes in northern Queensland in the 
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1893 general elections; some (but not all) more conservative separationists found their ardour for 
autonomy as a labour-led province — a possibility after the successes of 1893 — distinctly cooling. 
(Conversely, if enthusiasm among labour men went up a notch, this effect seems to have been 
quite moderate.256) As well as all the rhetoric about socialism, anarchy and so on, sugar interests, 
for example, could rightly fear that a labour government in power in Townsville would mean a 
faster end to cheaper Pacific Islander labour than was otherwise to be expected.257 While a 
provincial government could not have forced the Pacific Islanders to leave, its powers would have 
been amply sufficient for measures such as raising their wages so high that there would no longer 
have been any financial benefit in employing them in preference to Europeans. 
Despite the complexity of the scheme, which could not have been significantly diminished 
given its nature, one can only admire Griffith’s inventiveness and the apparently endless creativity 
of his intellect. After March 1891, he was not, admittedly, working entirely without help, for the 
first National Australasian Convention of 1891 had met and enabled him to test out various ideas 
with colleagues and the public, thereby enriching his own thinking with others’ suggestions — 
most notably, perhaps, Clark A-G’s due process clause. Nevertheless, the origins of the three-
Queenslands scheme pre-date that conference, and it is a testament to Griffith’s originality that 
he conceived it as an innovative solution to the agitation for separation (and it was also good 
drafting and debating practice for the successful effort at federating that was to come).258 The 
mature three-Queenslands scheme blended Canadian and American elements along with the 
occasional idea from other countries and some of Griffith’s own innovations, such as his two 
different sets of Vice-Regal arrangements and the rules about tariffs, into a substantial and 
workable scheme that was adapted to Queensland’s unique needs and also — here the circle was 
most cleverly squared — ensured that Australian federation was advanced rather than retarded 
if separatism triumphed in Queensland. 
Griffith showed his awareness that constitutionalism in general, and its British expression in 
particular, was not a set of unalterable semi-divine commandments but rather a set of constantly 
developing principles. He was not dogmatic but open to a variety of solutions, on the customs 
point, for example, and to some innovations, such as the idea of non-parliamentary ministers and 
allowing them to speak in the House. He did not impose his own ideas on questions such as 
whether each province was to have a unicameral or bicameral Parliament. 
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Nevertheless, Griffith had his own blind spots. His Senate was carefully structured to ensure 
exactly equal power for each province — down to the provision in the second Bill that an absolute 
majority was needed for all measures beyond the ordinary appropriations — and he even 
expressed the view that his plan otherwise would not have constituted a true federation, but 
merely a Canadian-style semi-federation.259 Griffith conceived of the safeguards of federalism as 
primarily political and not judicial. While he mentioned in passing the existence of judicial review, 
far more attention was given to the Senate as the protector of the northern province in particular 
against the numerical might of the south. Griffith did not grasp that a polity, once in existence and 
faced with a competing centre of power, would naturally attempt to aggrandise its own powers 
and that political safeguards were accordingly likely to be insufficient. Secondly, Griffith utterly 
failed to recognise the crucial role of judicial methods of interpretation in determining the extent 
of granted powers. No doubt the author of the implied immunities and reserved powers doctrines 
came to see the error of his ways on these points when a Federation was actually created and he 
was its principal judge faced with laws that a vigilant States’ house would never have passed and 
a minority of dissenting judges insisting on very different interpretative methods from his own. 
Most importantly, perhaps, in designing and explaining his scheme Griffith showed no 
serious awareness of the fact that, as the northern leader JM Macrossan, of all people, put it in 
the 1891 Australasian Convention, ‘the influence of party will remain much the same as it is now, 
and instead of members of the Senate voting, as has been suggested, as States, they will vote as 
members of parties to which they will belong’.260 In fact, there were already indicators on the 
horizon that the influence of party would not remain the same, but rather would grow 
considerably — most notably, the rise of labour candidates heralding the development of the 
modern disciplined political party over the following two decades. The same point was made by 
others at around this time, most famously by Alfred Deakin.261 But it appears to have escaped 
Griffith. 
Indeed, not merely the imminent rise of the modern party system but the very idea that 
class, ideological, religious or ethnic interests might cut across those of geographical location 
appears at first sight to have escaped Griffith entirely. But, although one is sometimes tempted to 
think so, the Premier who first banned and then, in a startling reversal, again permitted Pacific 
Island labour in Queensland,262 cannot possibly have failed to notice that northern labour men, 
even if separationists, had very different priorities from the bosses and landowners, and 
geography was not the key to all political differences.263 Perhaps he thought merely that 
geographical location was the proper or most obvious organising principle for resolving such 
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disputes if they could be resolved locally (in our own day, this thought has acquired a label: 
subsidiarity). He needed, however, to take much more seriously influences on political standpoint 
beyond mere geography, given that so many of those influences weakened the geographical 
determinants of political views that his scheme was designed to cater for and protect. 
It is true that the election of the senators by the provincial legislatures instead of by the 
people would have promoted geographical location at the expense of other interests somewhat; 
unless commanding a majority in (one House of) the provincial legislature, labour interests would 
presumably be unable to have any senators elected — but this thought throws light upon another 
glaring omission in the Griffith scheme: at no time was any in-depth consideration given to the 
method of selecting senators,264 and in particular to ensuring that a government, particularly in 
the single-House province(s), could not simply steamroll through its own cronies as senators. 
Griffith said merely, and rather naively, that he ‘did not know anything in history which tended to 
show’265 such a possibility! This sort of statement goes beyond mere demonstrative optimism and 
rhetorical appeals to the better angels of our nature. His view that the appointment as opposed 
to election of Lieutenant-Governors would attract a better class of man also sounds somewhat 
naive; although it is true that Australians have generally been extremely well served by their State 
Governors, the opportunities and temptations for kicking inconvenient colleagues upstairs to a 
doubly subordinate vice-vice-regal role would be legion, and the fact that the appointment would 
be made locally in Brisbane would have eliminated one important formal control — the 
authorities in London266 — as well as the informal control constituted by the need to be able to 
propose a name to the Monarch with a straight face. 
Griffith’s scheme was built for a type of gentlemanly politics that was going out of fashion 
as he spoke. For him, politics was a matter of principle just as much as power. But that was not 
everyone’s way of playing the game. 
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